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I. INTRODUCTION

I argue that digital piracy, on the individual level and within the
specific context ofcompact discs (CDs) and digital versatile discs (DVDs),
is motivated primarily by the relative price of purchasing an original item
versus the costs of compiling an illicit version; therefore, corrective
pricing and redistribution alone could significantly affect the decision to
pirate and ultimately reduce the practice. To illustrate this hypothesis, I
present a rough econometric model of how a consumer might price a
homemade pirated copy of either a CD or a DVD; implicitly, I assume that
CDs are the prevalent media for recording music and correspondingly, that
DVDs are used to capture and store motion pictures. I argue that one
solution to combating widespread fears about digital piracy is to correctly
price the various inputs (costs of recording devices, blank media and
software) as well as to encourage artists or producers to give added content

* J.D. expected 2004, University of Florida, Levin College of Law; B.A. in Economics,
New College of Florida (2001). The author would like to acknowledge and thank the following
people: Professor Thomas Cotter for his help, guidance, and suggestions in the field of intellectual
property, Professor Richard D. Coe for getting me started in economics and particularly law and
economics, and Professor Pat McDonald for inspiring and encouraging me to try to solve problems,
even with my poor mathematic skills.
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or value to the original media. This added value I dub the "nouveau
factor."
My analysis focuses predominantly on the individual, the hypothetical
homo economis but with a slight flaw. I assume that the individual is not
engaged in widespread attempts to sell unauthorized copies of copyrighted
works; the behavior I try to model is that of the tennis shoe pirate who
copies a friend's CD or downloads a movie off the Internet. The only
legally meaningful distinction is that such behavior, while still a violation
of the 1976 Copyright Act,I prosecution is less likely and, in the event of
prosecution, the resulting remedies will be diminished. I am not focusing
on widespread commercial piracy such as the mass manufacture of
"bootleg" copies intended for retail sale where the courts impose nontrivial
damage awards.' While this distinction is not profound, within the
confines of my attempted economic model, I only address individual
motivation because adding a for-profit element would require a different
analysis.
II. NAPSTER, THE PIRATE GENERATION AND FEELINGS OF UNFAIRNESS

"What is happening with global, peer-to-peer networking is not
altogether different from what happened when the American colonists
realized they were poorly served by the British Crown: The colonists were
obliged to cast off that power and develop an economy better suited to
their new environment." 3
In the closing decade of the twentieth century, the now infamous
Napster began providing a file-sharing service that permitted users to
download and exchange music over the Intemet.4 Napster's humble origins
1. Section 501 of the Copyright Act provides that "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner ...is an infringer." (emphasis added). 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2003). This
definition certainly encompasses the sort of behavior I wish to model and address.
2. Section 504 of the Copyright Act provides that:
"Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of copyright is liable for either - (1) the
copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, as provided by
subsection (b); or (2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c)." 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2003).
3. John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy ofIdeas, 8 WIRED 240 (2000).
4. A fair definition of the program's core functionality is that
Napster facilitates the transmission of MP3 files between and among its users. Through a
process commonly called "peer-to-peer" file sharing, Napster allows its users to: (1)make
MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives available for copying by other
Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other users' computers; and (3)
transfer exact copies of the contents of other users' MP3 files from one computer to another
via the Internet. These functions are made possible by Napster's MusicShare software,
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were "the brainchild of a college student who wanted to facilitate musicswapping by his roommate[,]" 5 but, in the end "it [became] far from a
simple tool of distribution among friends and family."6 Despite subsequent
litigation, injunctions, and attempts to reach agreements with the aggrieved
recording industry,' Napster ultimately fell from grace with the Internet
community and was quickly 'eplaced by a new breed of peer-to-peer
software.
A new generation of software developed in the wake of the Napster
lawsuits,' relied on a new and alternative method for its software that
lacked the legal vulnerabilities of Napster. "Napster's Achilles' heel was
available free of charge from Napster's Internet site, and Napster's network servers and
server-side software. Napster provides technical support for the indexing and searching of
MP3 files, as well as for its other functions, including a "chat room," where users can meet
to discuss music, and a directory where participating artists can provide information about
their music.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
5. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
6. Id. The opinion of Justice Patel inA & MRecords, Inc. v. Napster,Inc. elaborates on the
widespread use of Napster:
According to defendants internal documents, there will be 75 million Napster users by the
end of 2000.... At one point, defendant estimated that even without marketing, its "viral
service" was growing by more than 200 percent per month.... Approximately 10,000 music
files are shared per second using Napster, and every second more than 100 users attempt to
connect to the system.

Id.
7. This Note will use the definition of "recording industry" in a broad sense to encompass
the collective interests of the music industry in distribution and recording. My definition functions
the same as the one proposed by Yen:
This Article uses the term "recording industry" to refer to the plaintiffs in the Napster
litigation. Together, they represent the interests of the major actors in the production and
distribution of recorded music. These parties include A&M Records, Inc., Geffen Records,
Inc., Interscope Records, Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., MCA Records, Inc., Atlantic
Recording Corporation, Island Records, Inc., Motown Record Company L.P., Capitol
Records, Inc., La Face Records, BMG Music d/b/a The RCA Records Label, Universal
Records, Inc., Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc., Arista Records, Inc., Sire Records Group,
Inc., PolyGram Records, Inc., Virgin Records America, Inc., and Warner Bros. Records, Inc.
The Music Publisher plaintiffs include Jerry Leiber, individually and doing business as Jerry
Leiber Music, Mike Stoller, individually and doing business as Mike Stoller Music, and
Frank Music Corp.
See Complaint for Contributory and Vicarious Copyright Infringement, Violations of California
Civil Code Section 980(a)(2), and Unfair Competition, at 1; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (Nos. 99-5183 MHP & 00-0074 MHP), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/napster/riaa/napster_ complaint.pdf(last visited Nov. 24, 2003);
see Alfred C. Yen, A PreliminaryEconomic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright
Liability,and the Possibilityof CoaseanBargaining,26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 248 n.2 (200 1).
8. In the wake of Napster came programs such as Morpheus, Direct Connect, and Kazaa.
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that it retained a trace of the client-server model by depending on
centralized software." 9 However, successive software programs that vied
for the now vacant throne, such as Kazaa, went to a client-server model
that did not rely upon a central server or host sites. Instead, these new
programs provided what is known as peer-to-peer service; there was no
central computer server or centralized software of the sort that would give
rise to contributory infringement claims. The litigation pending against
Kazaa and other similar services will test the legal validity of the
distinction between centralized and decentralized servers. Regardless of
the ultimate failure of Napster,' ° the software gave voice and speed to a
digital movement arguably termed either a revolution or a rampage. But
the pyre of Napster, from whose ashes rose a whole new generation of
software, began with a spark' - the MP3 file format.' 2
MP3 files facilitate the sharing of music because they significantly
compress lengthy audio files that would otherwise take too long to transfer
between users over the Internet; the format preserves the audio integrity
of the original file but reduces the file size up to a factor of twelve.' 3 Also,
since MP3 files are digital copies, sound quality does not reduce for each
successive generation of copy (an issue with analog copies). Pirates do not
exclusively dominate the MP3 technology; many users choose to store
legal copies of music on their computers or other listening devices,
including the MP3 player. The capabilities of MP3 technology (and the
formats in development that will inevitably replace it), when combined
with the low price of home computers and recording devices, essentially
motivate a new generation of entertainment consumer.
The popularity of Napster and its successors indicates a demand for
Napster gave mainstream access to a new cultural
file-sharing programs.
"phenomenon"' 4 - downloading music and movies off the Internet in
9. Kurt Kleiner, Free Speech, Liberty, Pornography: The Internet and Peer to Peer
Networking, 169 NEW SCIENTIST 32 (2001).

10. Ultimately new peer-to-peer services that did not have the same centralized servers of the
type used by Napster severely restricted and rendered obsolete Napster's service. Napster never
realized the incredible commercial success predicted for it prior to the onslaught of litigation.
Napster filed for bankruptcy and dissolved its assets; Shawn Fanning had long ago gone his own
way. Yet, now, in Napster 2.0 the company has remained with a new business model. See
GRAMMY Magazine, A Napster Time Line, (June 3,2002), availableat http://www.grammy.com/
features/0 130_naptimeline.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
11. MP3 is an abbreviation of MPEG Audio Layer 3 developed in 1991. Id. at 254 n.26.
12. See id.; Yen, supranote 7, at 247, 254.
13. See Yen, supra note 7, at 255 (quoting a definition of MP3).
14.
Napster, even in its now defunct state, is a cultural phenomenon that has shaped the legal,
social, and artistic landscape in the Internet Age. Ironically, Napster has achieved this

CONFESSION OFA TENNIS SHOE PIRATE

order to produce a finished medium (be it a CD or a DVD) that substitutes
for the original copyrighted work. Not only has the price of recording
devices and media plummeted, but the access to free music and movies has
greatly increased because of peer-to-peer software. This movement results
in the piracy at issue in this Note. Napster and its kin represent more than
a string of ones and zeros; they represent a sentiment that the
entertainment industry overcharges for its services, or, from an even more
idealistic viewpoint - that the industry should disseminate its information
for free. Peer-to-peer software constitutes pirate's sword to some, while to
others, Robin Hood's arrow.
The nouveau factor introduced here explains the zeitgeist which must
force the entertainment industry to address the feelings of unfairness left
in the wake of the peer-to-peer explosion and to implement proper pricing
of the components of production for home copying (legal or otherwise).
Either the entertainment industry can address these feelings by cutting
retail prices or by attempting to add value to the retail versions of the
product. 5 Failing this, they may face a variation of the ratchet effect.
Typically, prices do not fall even when the cost of production falls, but this
pricing structure may work against the entertainment industry. Individuals
used to pirating CDs at a low price will resist going back to paying retail
prices. 6 Therefore, there remains an incentive to create yet another peerto-peer service, even if courts will swiftly shut it down. Each new
technological innovation will test and stretch the boundaries of copyright
law as programmers engage in a running cold war with the entertainment
industry.

importance in American culture and law without offering a service or business model that
generates any revenue. A company that has produced more clones than dollars will be
primarily remembered for the effect it has had on law and music long after it disappears from
the Internet scene.

Corey Rayburn, After Napster, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 16, 1 (2001) (citing Rob Walker, Napster: Show
Me the Money, SLATE MAGAZINE (May 2, 2000).

15. Some artists have already begun to make their music CDs interactive with a home
computer and added features like music videos, artist interviews, pictures, etc. Likewise, DVD
versions of films typically contain bonus material. This sort of behavior, if widespread and
significant (i.e., a nontrivial addition of value), could encourage consumers to purchase an original
product.
16. "1 love Napster. I'm never buying a CD again." See Andrew Cave, Music Industry
Caught Napping Napster, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 4, 2000, at 33 (quoting an anonymous fan

of the service).

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

(Vol. 8

III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION: SHELTER FOR CREATORS AND
PIRATES ALIKE

The very laws that shelter artists and safeguard originality also create
protection, or leave open loopholes, for potential digital piracy. The
narrow scope of this analysis only concerns the unauthorized copying of
music (sound recordings) 7 and movies (motion pictures) 8 on the

individual level. For the individual end-user, the legality of copying music
or movies onto another device or medium subsists in two exceptions; the
"first sale doctrine" and the capacity for "substantial non-infringing uses"
as defined by the court in Sony Corp.ofAmerica v. UniversalCity Studios,
Inc.'9 "The so-called first sale doctrine originated in general English
common-law rules of ancient ancestry disapproving restraints on the
alienation of owned property. The right of alienation was viewed as a basic
element of ownership. It was founded on policies favoring the free
transferability of land and, more particularly, goods."2 °

A copyright grants a property interest in the original expression
embodied in a tangible medium,2' but it does not necessarily22 give the
owner of the copyright the ability to "control the disposition of chattels in

17. I use the term "music" here in a general sense. Section 101 of the Copyright Act refers
to this element as "sound recordings":
"Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or
other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
18. Again, I use the term "movie" in the common cultural sense. Section 101 of the
Copyright Act refers to this element as "motion pictures": "'Motion pictures' are audiovisual works
consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of
motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any." Id.
19. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
20. Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy
Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1291 (2001) (quoting John M. Kemochan, The
DistributionRight in the United States of America: Review and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1407, 1412 n.163 (1989)).
21. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT INA GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY, 337-46
(2002) (describing the "first sale doctrine" and related case law).
22. I limit this statement because not all items are included under this rule; notably, shrink
wrap licensing agreements seek to amend the first sale doctrine on a contract law basis for
computer software. Likewise a copyright holder may enforce other limited rights against a
subsequent purchaser. See, for example, V.A.R.A. Provisions of Copyright Act giving limited
rights to artists. See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 2 1, at 401.
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[another's] lawful possession."23 The resulting tension results in the first
sale doctrine as codified in the 1976 Copyright Act.24
Under the aegis of this doctrine, author Carl Hiaasen may own the
copyright to "Naked Came the Manatee" and also possess the right to
license a film based on the work. But, he may not stop anyone from selling
their bona fide copy at a yard sale. By a similar token, a secondhand music
shop can operate with impunity, 2' and libraries can loan out their copies."
But, in the digital age, courts have besieged the first sale doctrine: "Up to
now, copyright law has focused primarily (though not exclusively... ) on
the physical, tangible copy as the basic unit of consumption and
infringement, the main threat to the copyright owner. For the first time,
digital 27technology is significantly challenging the very idea of a physical
copy.
This Note does not address the merits of an actual first sale right to
transmit digital copies on the Internet using "forward-and-delete
technology. ' 2' Rather, I examine two introductory questions that courts
must resolve in the context of digital piracy. First, could an individual
purchase a compact disc of the musical works of Shakira and burn a
second copy of the original for use in a car? Second, could that user legally
copy the songs onto a computer?
The 1976 Copyright Act, as amended by the Audio Home Recording
Act, expressly permits these sorts of copying (making a CD to play on
another device or transferring songs from a CD to a tape or vice versa) for
noncommercial purposes. 29 Likewise, the amended Copyright Act
23. Id. at 339.
24. Section 109(a) provides that "[njotwithstanding the provisions of § 106(3), the owner of
a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2003).
25. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 339-41 (discussing how it is not easy to resolve this
issue).
26. Id. at 339 (giving examples).
27. Liu, supra note 20, at 1255.
28. See Keith Kupferschmid, Lost in Cyberspace: The Digital Demise of the First Sale
Doctrine, 16 J. MARSHALL.J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 825, 852-53 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing
with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 547, 575, 584 (1997).
29. Section 1008 provides that:
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the
manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, a digital audio
recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or based on
the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for making digital
musical recordings or analog musical recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2003).
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expressly protects the right of a consumer to "back-up" computer
software.3" The rationale for this consumer protection is that
software is rarely run from the specific purchased copy; rather, software
is commonly run from a copy that is installed in the hard drive of a
computer. Thus, § 117 expressly privileges this type of copying. In
addition, § 117 provides an express exemption for software owners from
potential liability under MAI for merely running the software. Thus, the
owner of a copy of software, even if not permitted to do so under any
implied or express license, has the right to run that software as many times
as he or she wants, even if this results in the creation of "copies" in the
RAM of the computer. [This decision also] reflects a recognition that
owners of software may have a legitimate need to create backup copies of
software in case the original copy becomes destroyed or erased.3

By analogy, copying the contents of a disc (providing that this copy is
"lawfully made" in the contexts of section 109(a) - this might exclude
privately copying DVDs,32 but would permit the sale of professional copies
of the kind purchased at video stores) onto a personal computer for
noncommercial uses would be presumptively legal. The key here is
ownership of an original copy of the copyrighted material.33 Where such
30. Section 117(a) provides that:
Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy. -Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies
are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease
to be rightful.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (2003).
31. Liu, supra note 20, at 1295.
32. To prevent copying, manufacturers encrypt DVDs with a special proprietary technology
called Contents Scramble System (CSS). See Peter Sayer, 'DVD Jon' Heads Back to Court,
availableathttp://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid, 109654,00.asp (last visited Nov. 24,2003).
In late October 1999, a computer program called DeCSS, capable of decrypting the DVD disk for
viewing on an unlicensed player, appeared on a web site in Norway. Manufacturers charged the
creators of DeCSS with illegally circumventing, via hacking, the proprietary technology or
improperly reverse-engineering the technology in violation of a licensing agreement. Id. The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) amended the Copyright Act to address this sort of
issue. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2003). Section 1201(A) addresses and generally prohibits circumventing
technological measures to gain access to copyrighted works. Id.
33. The possibility of vicarious copyright infringement still exists even if one owned an
original CD of Metallica's And Justice For All but, via peer-to-peer software, downloads an
illegally made copy of the same album.
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ownership exists, "it appears that fair use acknowledges and gives some
greater protection to certain uses engaged in by the owners of copies in the
course of using such copies."34
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. provides legal
protection to the instrumentalities of digital piracy; the recording devices,
associated software, and even the blank media fall under the wide rubric
of Sony.35 Sony established the staple article of commerce doctrine to
"strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for
effective - not merely symbolic - protection of the statutory monopoly,

and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce." 36 As a result, Sony's sale of the Betamax VCR did not

constitute contributory infringement because other uses for the technology
besides copyright infringement existed. This doctrine of substantial noninfringing uses protects "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of
other articles of commerce, [do] not constitute contributory infringement
if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.""
The Sony court identified private, noncommercial time-shifting of
television programs in the home as a valid use of the technology at issue.38
34. Liu, supra note 20, at 1294.
35. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 774, 789 (1984).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Napster originally put forth an argument based on the holding in Sony; Napster asserted
the affirmative defenses of fair use and substantial non-infringing use. However, Napster did not
convince the lower court:
For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that any potential non-infringing use of the
Napster service is minimal or connected to the infringing activity, or both. The substantial
or commercially significant use of the service was, and continues to be, the unauthorized
downloading and uploading of popular music, most of which is copyrighted.
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The court of
appeals concluded that the district court correctly rejected Napster's allegation that their software
permitted space-shifting analogous to the time-shifting in Sony:
We conclude that the district court did not err when it refused to apply the "shifting" analyses
of Sony and Diamond. Both Diamond and Sony are inapposite because the methods of
shifting in these cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the copyrighted
material to the general public; the time or space-shifting of copyrighted material exposed the
material only to the original user.
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001); see Recording Indus.
Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999); see supra text
accompanying note 35. However, the court of appeals felt
bound to follow Sony, and [so] will not impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster
merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs'
copyrights.... We depart from the reasoning of the district court that Napster failed to
demonstrate that its system is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.
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Under the holding of Sony, consumers may purchase CD-recorders,
DVD-recorders, and blank media, as well as associated software programs,
as long as consumers generally use those products for legitimate purposes;
CDs and DVDs meet this minimal criteria.
The first sale doctrine in the digital age permits the public to copy CDs
for certain purposes; likely even allowing storage on computers. Even
before the technology existed, Sony established that companies could sell
the latest CD-RW and bundle it with the best ripping and burning software
available. Paired with inexpensive access to the Internet, particularly highspeed Internet, the current state of copyright law and its exceptions create
an atmosphere of cyber-lawlessness. After all, the Internet has been called
the wild west.39 Not only may the public purchase legal and inexpensive
recording devices and accessories but also over a dozen peer-to-peer
services make available a widespread selection of digital music (facilitated
by the MP3 technology and the practice of storing music on personal
computers). Add to that the low risk of prosecution for piracy at an
individual level and it is not hard to understand that Napster and its
descendants posed a threat to the record labels. Clearly, something must
change. Certainly, Congress could significantly change the substantive
copyright law, perhaps adding draconian punishments for those individuals
who engage in digital piracy. However, an economic analysis charts a
different course based on consumer consumption models, individual
decision making functions, and proper pricing of inputs, as well as
addressing more intangible notions such as consumer perceptions of
fairness.
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE INCENTIVE TO PIRATE

Digital piracy's illegality has little impact on the individual decisionmaking function.4" While this outcome may surprise some, it would not
Id. at 1020-21.
39. See Jonathan J. Rusch, Cyberspace and the "Devil's Hatband," 24 SEATrLE U. L. REV.
577 (2000); Henry E. Crawford, Internet Calling: FCCJurisdiction Over Internet Telephony, 5
CoMM. L. CONSPECTUS 43,43 (1997) (discussing the Internet and analogizing it to the wild west).
40. Critics could argue that people act irrationally when they break the law; so, this sort of
behavior falls outside the scope of economic analysis. Critics make the facile retorts common in
introductory economics such as the difficulty in accurately revealing preferences, etc. Moving
beyond those sorts of arguments, I think that people decide to violate copyright law not for the
same reasons as they commit so-called crimes of passion (murder and rape) but for the same
reasons they commit white-collar crimes like embezzlement. A wealth of economic literature on
this sort of crime exists. See Amayta Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
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shock an economist. A simple behavioral model of this type of conduct
(with the usual economic assumptions)4 ' reveals the copyright laws'
shortcomings. An individual discounts the value of the expected
punishment because the risk of prosecution for piracy (Rp) is low (both
objectively low as well as subjectively low since individuals may further
underestimate the probability of being caught).42 Taking into account all
physical costs (C) associated with making the copy and assuming the
punishment consist of a fine (F), then the cost of a pirated CD (P 0opy) is:
P

(F * Rp) + C

=
=py

Yet, if the punishment consists of a jail sentence (J) (measured in years)
then the analysis takes into account opportunity costs and lost value of
future earnings. Accounting for lost wages per year (W) and all physical
costs (C) associated with copying, the cost of the pirated CD (PcoPy),
discounted to the present value using the interest rate (r), would be:
PCopy = [(J * W) * Rp + C] / (1+r) J

Making the CD or DVD becomes a costly endeavor. Still, for either fine
or punishment, the rational customer purchases this illegal copy as long as
Pcopy < Pauthentic (the consumer may choose either the copy or the original
when faced with equality of prices).
These two simple models illustrate the deterrent effect of punishment
and the probability of detection on the cost-benefit analysis behind the
decision to commit digital piracy. Implementing an extremely effective
method of enforcing laws or creating harsh punishments for the few
individuals prosecuted for piracy would effect the individual decision
making process. But, based on the following economic analysis, I propose
a different solution from the usual detection/punishment dichotomy.
The basic models presented above sketch the process I analyze,
specifically the decision making function of a potential copyright
infringer. But the heart of my Note describes a more accurate model of the
decision to pirate. I present a cost function model for a pirated copy in
Equation 1. Keep in mind the rational consumer will "buy" the pirated
Foundations of Economics Theory, 6 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 317 (1977), quoted in JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 109 (West Group 2002).
41. Assume an individual who is risk-adverse, rational, deterable and does not violate
revealed preferences, etc.
42. Section 506 provides for criminal penalties for copyright violations. 17 U.S.C. § 506
(2000).
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copy when its costs less to make it than to purchase an authentic copy
(Pcopy < Pauthentic).

Equation I
P'opyx

Pm+ [(3 Pr)/X] + T(Wa) + N

P.= price of blank media
P, = price of recording devices
N = the nouveau factor (a constant used to explain residual value of an
authentic copy)
W = wages per unit time (opportunity costs)
T = time it takes to make a copy including search costs
P = a time weighting factor indicating a decrease as a function of time
a = a time weighting factor indicating an increase as a function of time
X = the number of copies made on the same device (depreciating the
initial cost of purchasing the recording device over the total
number of copies made)
The prices of the blank media as well as the recording devices decrease as
a function of time (they get less expensive to purchase as more are
produced, etc). The consumer must pay a substantial initial purchase price
for the recording device, but the total number of copies made previously
discounts the cost of producing any given copy. Given the current state of
technology, 3, Pr, and [(3 P,)/x] will fall as a function of time and as a
function of the quantity of copies produced (consider the impact of bulk
purchases on the price of blank media). In fact, if the consumer takes the
limit of Equation 1 with respect to time (3), the value of 13, Pro, and [(13
P,)/x] falls to zero.
While the price of inputs fall towards a fixed rate, opportunity costs do
not fall. In fact, since wages tend to increase as a function of time (at the
very least, they increase enough to offset normal inflation that would drive
up the costs of Pm and P,) T(W) will increase as a function of time. So,
given an examination of Equation I over time, T(Wa) emerges as the
relevant variable group for analysis. If wages lost during the time it takes
to create a copy exceed the cost of an original copy, then the rational
consumer will purchase the effectively cheaper original. Teenagers may
have embraced services like Napster wholeheartedly because of these
comparatively low opportunity costs, including their low earning potential,
and that they attach a relatively lower value to their leisure time (since
they have more of it). The classic labor/leisure tradeoff suggests that older
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people with typically greater opportunity costs (less spare time due, in
part, to work and a higher wage rate) do not find it cost-effective to pirate
software, even with inexpensive blank media and hardware. So, while
some find raising the hourly wage an attractive proposal, I do not see it as
a logical method to reduce the incentive to make unauthorized duplicates
of copyrighted works. Fortunately, Equation 1 suggests several other
courses of action.
Consider the 3 Pm + [(3 Pr)/X] segment of Equation 1; these describe
the price functions of the raw factors of production. If inputs (blank media
and recording devices) cost more and a sales tax maintained the higher
price,4" the market would create an effective price floor for copies. For
example, if blank CDs cost five dollars, this would effectively subtract five
dollars off the price of an authentic copy, assuming a tax-exempt or taxpreferred company produced the authentic copy. On one extreme, no one
would have an incentive to pirate if blank media prices exceeded the price
of authentic copies. Ideally, the tax revenue from artificially buoying the
price of the inputs should not go to the producers of the inputs; rather, the
revenue should go to compensate copyright holders who may lose sales
volume to piracy or other inhibition costs." While this may seem attractive
to some, inflating prices in this manner has its drawbacks. Unfortunately,
these higher post-tax prices would exist even for non-infringing uses and
the higher prices would have a chilling effect on legitimate endeavors.4 5
The nouveau factor constitutes a straggling variable in Equation 1.
However, the nouveau factor represents a way to substantially deter piracy.
Observing the contrast between the presentation of old vinyl records
compared to compact discs inspired the development of the nouveau
factor. Furthermore, companies now sell a new generation of compact
discs that include extras such as photographs, interviews, and video clips.
DVD versions of films frequently offer extended scenes, director
43. The government currently imposes a tax such as the one I propose applied to home

recording equipment where the tax revenue compensates the recording industry. In order not to
have a chilling effect on business, the proposed tax would have to discriminate between individual
consumers who would use recording devices and media for enjoyment and businesses who need
these devices to back-up data or perform other business related tasks.
44. In fact, the knowledge that blank media costs so little incomparison to the retail price of
copyrighted works may generate ill will in the consumer. Corrective pricing might ease the
resentment of individuals who feel that their money goes entirely to the record label because blank
discs cost pennies and the artists don't get to see the money anyway.
45. Theoretically, the possibility exists to differentiate between the end goals of consumers
and set various tax rates accordingly. Imposing this kind oftax system would require either retailers
or the government to distinguish between legal and illegal uses and would raise many of the same
dilemmas the current copyright system faces.
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commentaries, and other material beyond the scope of the underlying
motion picture.
A marketable segment of the consumer population considers the
presentation value of the records or the new enhanced discs higher than the
other formats; the music remained the same, but the art and the added
lyrics and photographs enhance the experience. Consumers feel they get
more than just the music; as one record enthusiast put it, he enjoys the
experience of opening and playing a vinyl record. If artists add the
nouveau factor to their works and the retail price remains the same
(granted artists must identify and define the elements of the nouveau factor
which is an inexorably link with the creative process itself), they would
add value to the product beyond the mere sound recording or motion
picture the consumer has purchased.
Finally, the industry could mandate a decrease in the retail price of
music and movies, effectively lowering Pauthentic and swinging the
purchasing decision back towards authorized copies. While this may not
seem like an attractive proposal to the current industry, it would certainly
decrease the incidents of piracy and help producers recover plundered
profits. In the best-case scenario, producers would recoup the sales lost to
piracy and the lower retail prices would result in higher demand and
subsequent sales. Certainly, the entertainment industry and their lobbyists
would resist this scenario and would meet it with tremendous rent-seeking
efforts. As a result, prohibitively high transaction costs associate with this
proposal.
If the recording industry would combine an increase in price of inputs
(with the profits ideally going to the copyright holders), more and varied
content to accompany the core copyrighted material, and a moderate
decrease in the retail price of the copyrighted material an intriguing
solution results. The industry must make the price of the original
copyrighted product closer to the costs of producing a pirated copy and
they must ensure that the original has some added bonus, the nouveau
factor, which a pirated version cannot loot.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Copyright law does a remarkable job of protecting many forms of
creative efforts; however, the digital age has raised definite problems for
protecting music compositions and sound recordings. Considering the
general apathy towards individualized acts of piracy and the widespread
use of file-sharing programs such as Kazaa, statutory revisions would not
adequately curb illegal copying. At the same time, general criticism would
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result if Congress passed a set of laws that made most of the general public
into criminals because the government would undermine the legitimacy of
law. Recognizing that legislative action will not, as of now, realistically
solve what I call tennis shoe pirates, we should turn to economic attempts
for deterrence.
Opportunity drives piracy; piracy requires low opportunity costs
coupled with a low probability of incurring any serious legal
consequences. In analyzing the rudimentary production functions
presented in this Note, neither steep fines nor serious jail time would
effectively curb piracy. The general belief of economic theory postulates
that individuals not only do not objectively perceive the probability of
prosecution, but individuals also subjectively discount the likelihood of
their own prosecution. Therefore, relying on the probability of detection
to discount the expected value of an act of piracy flaws the deterrence
models. I favor the economic model proposed in this Note, where taxation
holds the factors of production (e.g., blank media) artificially high.
Coupled with a move by the recording industry to reduce the price of retail
products as well as a move by artists to add bonus material or presentation
value to their work, the value of an original work will increase. As a result,
the industry can achieve the equilibrium solution where the authentic copy
costs the same or more than the pirated version. Lower prices result in
greater sales for retail copies which allows the tax revenue from sales of
factors of production to offset losses suffered by artists and the recording
industry.
Ideally, in the end producers receive at least the same amount of
revenue as before and piracy motivates fewer consumers. While such a
condition does not result in Pareto optimality, such a solution seems
impossible. I firmly grounded the model presented and argued for in
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency where the market deliberately strips the gains of
pirates and uses them to compensate the losses of artists and their
industries. Certainly I recognize the difficulty in administering some
elements of the solution proposed. Specifically, the tax on factors of
production requires extensive study to determine the ideal price; as does
the elasticity of demand for consumers as well as for businesses so as not
to have a chilling effect on purchases. While I call for a bifurcated price
structure (one for individuals and one for businesses with valid tax
identities) I acknowledge that this would create an incentive for arbitrage;
and, a sudden and drastic increase in the price of blank media would
significantly benefit consumers who have large "stock piles." Despite the
potential problems, I still support an economic deterrence model as a
means of curbing digital piracy; I strongly urge that any model or proposal
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focus primarily on the factors of production and the nouveau factor rather
than the usual expected value analysis.

